

# If it can be measured it can be improved

**Andrew Artz**

AFE Presentation | Friday 10.2.2020



# Andrew Artz

## Pathways Student (Computer Science)

Dual Degree Masters of Public Policy &  
Masters of City and Regional Planning Candidate (May 2021)



### *Previously:*

- Search & Extraction for CBRN task force
- Regional transportation committee
- Non-profit advocate for non-motorized transportation in mostly rural communities

### *Currently:*

- Data wrangler and Splunk Power User
- Forecasting usage of the National Vulnerabilities Database
- Pitching new ideas to audiences with more experience *and* audiences with less technical backgrounds

**If it can be measured  
it can be improved**

# Mission


To promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life.

# Vision

NIST will be the world's leader in creating critical measurement solutions and promoting equitable standards. Our efforts stimulate innovation, foster industrial competitiveness, and improve the quality of life.

# Core Competencies

- Measurement science
- Rigorous traceability
- Development and use of standards





U.S. Department of Commerce

# NIST



## COMPUTER SECURITY DIVISION

### SECURITY TESTING, VALIDATION AND MEASUREMENT

# NVD

Congressional Research Service  
Informing the legislative debate since 1914

**IN FOCUS**

Updated March 27, 2020

### Disrupted Federal Elections: Policy Issues for Congress

**Introduction**  
The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak has renewed interest in how election administrators and political campaigns prepare for emergencies and natural disasters. Some states have postponed primary elections. Political campaigns have expanded online outreach in lieu of in-person events. According to media reports, national party conventions are proceeding as scheduled, but contingency plans are under consideration. Legislation has proposed additional funding and voting options in federal elections. As of this writing, legislation and election planning are changing daily. This product will be updated periodically.

This updated CRS In Focus briefly introduces historical and policy issues that could be relevant for congressional oversight, legislation, or appropriations related to what this product calls *disrupted elections*. This term means events such as natural disasters, other emergencies, or circumstances that could substantially delay or prevent normal voting, election administration, or campaigning.

Disrupted election administration includes such as fire, circumstances. Election Day preparation for after Election Day more traditional long lines, similar problems emergency here also available to

**116<sup>th</sup> Congress**  
Several bills relevant for provisions COVID-19




- A third million Assistant states. The version the new the bill, H.R. provision House.

• S. 1397 would require states to accept a federal write-in ballot. Currently, the only such ballot is the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB), a backup federal ballot for military and overseas voters (discussed below) whose state ballots do not arrive on time.

• S. 840 and H.R. 6707 would require states to establish voting contingency plans for, and require states to accept absentee ballots during, certain declared emergencies. S. 3529 contains similar contingency and absentee voting provisions, and would extend additional voting options and requirements to subsequent federal elections.

**Selected Recent Examples**  
COVID-19 is a recent and prominent example of election disruption, but is by no means the only such example.

- Super Typhoon Yaku struck the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) approximately 10 days before Election Day 2018. This election included



# NIST

## VULNERABILITIES

## CVE-2020-11500 Detail

### Current Description

Zoom Client for Meetings through 4.6.9 uses the ECB mode of AES for video and audio encryption. Within a meeting, all participants use a single 128-bit key.

[+View Analysis Description](#)

### Severity

CVSS Version 3.x

CVSS Version 2.0

#### CVSS 3.x Severity and Metrics:



NIST: NVD

Base Score: 7.5 HIGH

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

*NVD Analysts use publicly available information to associate vector strings and CVSS scores. We also display any CVSS information provided within the CVE List from the CNA.*

*Note: NVD Analysts have published a CVSS score for this CVE based on publicly available information at the time of analysis. The CNA has not provided a score within the CVE List.*

### QUICK INFO

**CVE Dictionary Entry:**[CVE-2020-11500](#)**NVD Published Date:**

04/03/2020


**NVD Last Modified:**

04/07/2020

**Source:**





MITRE

# The Objectives of Information Security




NIST Special  
Publication  
800-12, revision 1  
*An Introduction to  
Information  
Security* section  
1.4

# A “normal” day





# Example: Lock suspected ransomware



# When one door closes



# My major takeaway: Triage

My old model:

	Negligible	Minor	Moderate	Significant	Severe
Very Likely	Low Med	Medium	Med Hi	High	High
Likely	Low	Low Med	Medium	Med Hi	High
Possible	Low	Low Med	Medium	Med Hi	Med Hi
Unlikely	Low	Low Med	Low Med	Medium	Med Hi
Very Unlikely	Low	Low	Low Med	Medium	Medium

My new model:

$[SPV = R]$ , or Severity \* Probability \* Value = Risk